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Brokers-Compensation-Evidence- Dual Agency.--Findings 
that defendant real estate broker \vas middleman and not 
agent or either party in securing lease for plaintiff are not 
supported by evidence showing as matter of law that broker 
was not agent with limited authority, but was, as disclosed by 
his own testimony of arrangement between him and plaintiff, 
vested with authority to sec if he "could get one of the deals" 
from owner, that is, with owner building improvements as 
offered by plaintiff, or at lesser rent without improvements 
as otr'ered by owner, thereby showing he had right or duty to 
exercise some discretion with reg·ard to terms on which prin-
cipals would deal. 
[8] !d.-Compensation-Dual Agency.-H defendant was acting as 
broker under Real Estate Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10000 et 
seq.) in procuring lease of realty for plaintiff, policy of law 
against dual representation ( § 10176, subd. (d)) is applicable 
to him. 
[9] !d.-Compensation-Dual Agency.-A real estate broker who 
acted as agent for both lessee and lessor in securing lease 
cannot recover compensation from either unless he disclosed 
to both his agreement to receive compensation from both. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Joseph M. Maltby, Judge. Reversed. 
Action by lessees against real estate broker for declaratory 
relief. J udgmeut for defendant reversed. 
Lyle M. Stevens for Appellants. 
Leo Friedman and Orlan S. Friedman for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-By his complaint in this action plaintiff 
sought to have it declared that he was not under obligation 
to pay defendant an amount agreed upon as compensation for 
sevices rendered by defendant in procuring a lease of certain 
real property for plaintiff. Defendant by cross-complaint 
sought to recover said compensation from plaintiff. Judg-
ment was rendered in favor of defendant, and plaintiff has 
appealed. 
From the trial court's findings it appears that E. D. 
Mitchell owned certain real property in the city of Long 
Beach. Plaintiff was desirous of leasing the property from 
Mitchell and, on October 24, 1952, he authorized defendant 
to submit to Mitchell an offer to lease the property. It was 
thereupon orally agreed between plaintiff and defendant that 
if plaintiff were able to secure a lease of the property he 
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would pay defendant 5 per cent of the net profits from the 
business to be conducted on the property by plaintiff. 'l'he 
oral agreement was followed by a written agreement on 
October 27, 1952. The offer from plaintiff to Mitchell for 
such lease was transmitted by defendant to and refused by 
Mitchell. But on October 28, 1952, Mitchell authorized de-
fendant to submit a written offer for a lease of the property 
to plaintiff, varying from plaintiff's offer, which provided 
that Mitchell would pay defendant a 3 per cent commission. 
'l'he latter offer was submitted by defendant to plaintiff and 
was accepted by him. Thereafter, on November 4, 1952, 
plaintiff and Mitchell, without defendant's participation, 
executed a lease of the property. Mitchell had no knowledge 
of the 5 per cent agreement between plaintiff and defendant, 
but plaintiff knew defendant was to receive a 3 per cent com-
mission from Mitchell. The court then found that defendant 
was acting as a middleman to bring plaintiff and Mitchell 
together and was not an agent of either, hence the 5 per cent 
agreement was valid and enforceable because in such a situa-
tion the rule was not applicable that an agent may not recover 
compensation from both principals unless full disclosure was 
made to each. The court also found that defendant had no 
authority to vary the terms of or exercise any discretion 
in connection with plaintiff's offer to Mitchell and the same 
was true of the offer from Mitchell to plaintiff. It was ad-
mitted that defendant was, at the time of the transaction 
here involved, a licensed real estate broker. 
The evidence is as follows: Defendant testified tl1at, before 
contacting plaintiff, he knew Mitchell wanted to lease the 
property, but had no listing from him. About October 24, 
1952, he approached plaintiff, who was engaged in the ham-
burger sandwich business, and talked to him about leasing 
the Mitchell property. Thereafter three writings on plaintiff's 
stationery, addressed to defendant, setting forth the agree-
ment as to defendant's commission between the parties, were 
signed by plaintiff.* The first document was dated October 
24, 1952, the second October 27, 1952, and the third November 
5, 1952. The first two were signed on October 27, 1952. The 
first docnment stated that defendant was therewith authorized 
"to offer for me" (plaintiff) a proposition to lease a portion 
of MitcJJrll 's property in the city of Long Beach at a rental 
*Apparently the papers were signed in blank by plaintiff and filled 
in by defendant but no question is here presented that these documents 
were agreed to by plaintiff. 
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a vvriting (hereinafter called fourth writing) addressed to 
defendant in which Mitchell agreed to lease the property to 
plaintiff for a term of 10 years at per month; no pro-
vision was made for by Mitchell and it embodied 
the same basic terms as later appeared in the 
lease executed and Mitchell; Mitchell also agreed 
therein to pay defendant 3 per cent of the total rental as a 
commission.'' Defendant advised plaintiff of 
Mitchell's offer and plaintiff on the fourth writing 
his thereof. Defendant was paid the 3 per cent 
Mitchell at ihe time the fourth was signed and 
before and Mitchell executed the lease. Defendant 
testified he did not remember ·whether he told lVlitehell he was 
a commission from plaintiff. The lease was signed 
on November ·1, 1952. Mitchell testified that defendant took 
no in any negotiations after getting the fourth writing 
signed by both parties. 
[1] Plaintiff's case is based on the rule that "[\V]here an 
has assumed to act in a double capacity, a principal 
who has no knowledge of such dual representation ... may 
avoid the transaction. Actual injury is not the principle 
upon which the law holds such transaction voidable; rather, 
the law holds it voidable in order to prevent the agent from 
putting himself in a where he will be tempted to 
betray his principal. ... To this point l\ifec:hem in his work 
on agency, second volume 2, section 2138, page 1715, 
says: ' ... an agent who is relied upon to exercise, in behalf 
of his principal, his skill, judgment, knowledge or influence, 
will not be permitted without such principal's full knowledge 
and consent, to undertake to the other party also 
in the same transaction. Such condurt is a fraud upon his 
principal, and not only will the agent not be entitled to com-
pensation for servicrs so rendered, but the contract or dealings 
made or had by the agent, >Yhile so also for the other 
party without the knowledge or consent of the principal, are 
not binding upon the latter, and if they still remain executory, 
be may repudiate them on that ground, or, if they have been 
exeeuted in whole or in part, he may by acting promptly and 
before the rights of innocent parties have intervened, restore 
the eonsideration received, rescind the contraet and reeover 
back the property or rights with which he has parted under 
it. It makes no difference that the princjpal was not in fact 
injured, or that the agent intended no wrong or that the 
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upon the principal and he is not bound.' " (Vice v. Thacker, 
30 Cal.2d 84, 90 [180 P.2d 4] ; see also Glenn v. Rice, 174 Cal. 
269 [162 P. 1020] ; Butler v. Solano Land Co., 203 Cal. 231 
[263 P. 530]; Gorclon v. Beck, 196 Cal. 768 [239 P. 309]; 2 
Cal.Jur.2d, Agency, § 107; 9 CaLJ ur.2d, Brokers, § 77; Rest., 
§ 390 et seq.; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10176, subd. (d).) 
[2] It is also held that neither principal is liable for the 
commission unless both knew of the dual representation, 
even if one does know of it he is not liable if the other does 
not, which is the situation we have here, because, as above noted, 
knew defendant was to receive a commission from 
MitchelL 'rhe rule is thns stated: ''His 's] con-
tract for compensation beh1g thus tainted, the law will not 
permit him to enforce it against either party .... And the 
fact that the party whom he sues was aware of the double 
agency and of the payment, or agreement to pay, compensa-
tion by the other party, and consented thereto, does not entitle 
him to recover. He must show knowledge by both parties. 
One party might willingly consent, believing that the advan-
tage would accrne to him, to the detriment of the other. The 
law will not tolerate such an arrangement, except with the 
knowledge and consent of both, and will enter into no inquiry 
to determine whether or not the particular negotiation was 
fairly conducted by the agent. It leaves him as it finds him, 
affording him no relief." (Glenn v. Rice, snpra, 17 4 Cal. 
269, 272; see also Gordon v. Beck, supra, 196 Cal. 768; Riggins 
v. Patterson, 37 Cal.App. 319 [174 P. 119]; cases collected 
14 A.L.R. 464; SO A.L.R. 1075.) 
The question presented, therefore, is whether the evidence 
shows as a matter of la1Y that the arrangement did not fall 
within the so-calle(1 middleman exception to the dual repre-
sentation rule later discussed herein. Defendant contends 
that plaintiff does not question the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the findings favorable to the exception and that 
they show that defendant had no discretion in exercising 
his agency and hence he was what is sometimes euphemisti-
cally called a middleman; that under such circumstances the 
agent may receive compensation from both principals without 
disclosing to either that he had an arrangement with both 
for a commission. [3] The exception is stated: "If the 
scope of a broker's employment is limited to bringing parties 
together so that they may negotiate their own contract, he 
is a mere middleman. Upon performance, he is entitled to 
compensation from each of them who has agreed to pay him, 
.July 1955] McCoNNELr" v. CowAN 
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en·n though the others are Ullaware of such employment. 
[ 4] But if a broker engaged by both parties is clothed with 
some diseretion in the matter of advising or negotiating the 
transaction. he eannot recover compensation from either, un-
less both of them knew of the double agency at the time of 
the transaction." (9 CaLJur.2d, Brokers, § 77; ser also Clm·k 
v. 125 Cal. 276 [57 P. 985] ; Green v. Robertson, 64 
Cal. 7:"5 [28 P. 446]; King v. l?ccd, 21 Cal.App. 229 [141 
l'. 41]; Carothers v. Caine, 38 Cal.App. 71 [175 P. 478]; 
v. 109 Cal.App. 662 [293 P. ; Ander-
son v. Tlwcher, 76 Cal.App.2d 50 [172 P.2d 533]; Ilooper· 
Y. 114 Cal.App.2d 802 [2:-il P.2d 330]; Butler v. 
Solano Land Co., 8Hpra, 203 Cal. 231; Hest., Agency, §§ 390-
394.) [5) 'I' he 1vonl "midd1eman" is a short term for 
describing a situation in which the agent has limited authority, 
that he has no power to and does not negotiate the terms 
on "Which the principals will deal, yet he is an or he 
may possibly be an independent contractor, or falls in one 
of 1 he recognized legal categories.* [6] Being so limited, 
there is no opportunity for him to sacrifice the interests of 
one prineipal to the detriment of the other and the reason 
for ihe dual representation rule fails. 
"While plaintiff could have been more speeific in his attack 
on the findings (he claims the findings that defendant "Was 
a middleman and not an agent for either party ar8 conclu-
sions of law), it is clear that his basie premise is that the 
evid(•nce shows as a matter of law that this was not a situ-
iion where an agent had limited authority-no right or duty 
to exercise discretion or negotiate in regard to the terms 
upon which the prineipals would deal. 
[7] The \\Titings shed Ho light on the scope of defend-
ani's anthority but defendant's own testimony of the arrange-
ment between him and plaintiff shows as a matter of law 
that this is not a ease of an agent with limited authority 
and hence the findings are not supported by the evidence. 
It is true, as pointed out by defendant, that plaintiff testified 
in regard to the first writing that he was to pay the 5 per 
cent commission if defendant got the lease from Mitchell 
on the terms there stated, which would indicate that defend-
aut's sole power was to transmit the offer, and the same is 
true as to lVIitchell and his offer, the fourth writing, but 
*Commonly a middleman is a trader who buys commodities from the 
producer and sells them to the retailer or sometimes directly to the 
consumer. 
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plaintiff's offer was rejected by Mitchell, and according to 
defendant's own version (heretofore quoted), he was to see 
if he ''could get one of the deals,'' from Mitchell, that is, 
with Mitchell building the improvements as offered by plain-
tiff, or at a le,ser rent without improvements as offered by 
Mitchell. There was, therefore, vested in defendant, authority 
to with Mitchell and get one deal or the other-
exercise some discretion. The fact that the lease was drawn 
and executed without any participation by defendant is not 
significant, because the basic terms thereof had already been 
stated in Mitchell's offer and plaintiff's acceptance of it (the 
fourth writing). It is undisputed that defendant was engaged 
in the real estate brokerage business and one of his specialties 
was the negotiation of leases. He said that plaintiff could 
not obtain a lease from Mitchell on his own initiative and 
that he was to receive the 5 per cent commission for getting 
a lease from Mitchell. It appears from defendant's testi-
mony and the undisputed evidence that the transaction was 
one in which defendant was more than a mere errand boy-
servant for plaintiff and Mitchell, to carry offers from one 
to the other. Although it has been held that whether a 
person is a "middleman" is generally one of fact ( Clm·k v. 
Allen, supra, 125 Cal. 276), it is one of law here on defend-
ant's own testimony as to the arrangement. 
The cases in whic:h it has been held that the agent had no 
discretion and could receive commissions from both parties 
are distinguishable. In Clark v. Allen, supra, 125 Cal. 276, 
and Green v. Robertson, supra, 64 Cal. 75, the facts do not 
appear. In J(ing v. Reed, s~tpra, 24 Cal.App. 229, the broker 
had only one fixed price which he could transmit to the 
proposed bnyer. In Ca1·othe1·s v. Caine, supra, 38 Cal.App. 
71, only an offer was to be transmitted. Moreover, the last 
cited case is contrary to Butler v. Solano Land Co., supra, 
203 Cal. 231, and is impliedly overruled by that case. In 
Kennedy v. Johnson, supra, 109 Cal.App. 662, the negotia-
tions and deal were made by the principals and the broker 
only brought them in contact. In Anderson v. Thacher, supra, 
76 Cal.App.2d 50, Hooper v. Mayfield, supra, 114 Cal.App. 
2d 802, and Butler v. Solano Lancl Co., supra, 208 Cal. 231, 
the rule was stated but found not applicable in those cases. 
Consideration should also be given to the Real Estate Law 
regulating the business of real estate brokers and salesmen. 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10000 et seq.) That statute states 
the policy against dual representation. A broker's license 
,July 1955) McCoNNELL v. CowAN 
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may be revoked or suspended if, while he is ''performing or 
attempting to perform" any of the acts within the scope 
of the regulatory act, he is guilty of ''acting for more than 
one party in a transaction without the knowledge or consent of 
all parties thereto." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10176, subd. (d).) 
The act defines a broker as one who ''offers to buy [or sell], 
lists, or solicits for prospective purchasers" of real estate 
and also one who for compensation "negotiates ... leases 
[of], or offers to lease" real estate. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 10131.) "One act, for a compensation" of "offering for 
another to buy or sell ... real estate" or "leasing ... 
real estate" shall constitute acting as a broker. (Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 10134.) [8] If defendant was acting as a 
broker then under the act the policy against dual represen-
tation is applicable to him. The cases holding that various 
activities and scopes of authority were not within the act-
that the agent was only a "middleman "-involved the exer-
cise of less authority than defendant exercised in this case. 
In Freeman v. Jergins, 125 Cal.App.2d 536 [271 P.2d 210], 
Shaffer v. Beinhon1, 190 Cal. 569 [213 P. 960), JicKenna v. 
Edwards, 19 Cal.App.2d 327 [65 P.2d 810], and Crofoot 
v. Spivak, 113 Cal.App.2d 146 [248 P.2d 45}, the one claim-
ing compensation was only to find and introduce to the 
seller a person who might be interested as a buyer; he neither 
had nor exereised any other authority. In other cases the 
authority was broader and a different result was reached 
(see II oopcr v. Mayfield, supra, 114 Cal. A pp.2d 556 ; .Abrams 
v. Ouston, 110 Cal.App.2d 556 [243 P.2d 109] ; Rhode v. 
Bartholomew, 94 Cai.App.2d 272 [210 P.2d 768]; Davis v. 
Chipman, 210 Cal. 609 [293 P. 40]; Ryan v. TValker, 35 
Cal.App. 116 [Hi9 P. 417]; Crarn v. McNeil, 32 Cal.App. 
101 [162 P. 140] ). 
[9] Applying the rule announced in the above cited cases 
to the facts of this case leads us to the inevitable conclusion 
that defendant acted as agent for both plaintiff and Mitchell, 
and he, therefore, cannot recover compensation from either 
unless he disclosed to both his agreement to receive compen-
sation from both. This he admittedly failed to do. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
